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Anosognosia for hemiplegia (AHP) refers to a lack of awareness regarding 
paralysis after stroke. Despite attracting clinical interest for decades, empirical 
research into AHP has been relatively scarce, and there remains no universally 
accepted explanation (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). This is partially due to 
difficulty characterising the disorder. The term has been applied to both partial and 
complete lack of awareness, with partial unawareness presenting as a failure to 
recognise, appreciate the severity, or acknowledge the consequences of paralysis, and 
more complete cases involving a failure to admit the presence of a paralysis even after 
its demonstration (Orfei et al., 2007). The fact that some patients verbally deny their 
problems, but show behaviours consistent with their paralysis (e.g. executing a bi-
manual tasks using a unimanual strategy), while others verbally accept their paralysis 
but behave in a manner inconsistent with this acceptance (e.g. attempting to walk), 
suggests that verbal and behavioural awareness are independent (Jehkonen et al., 
2006). The observation of diverse lesion sites, emotional, perceptual, and cognitive 
impairments in anosognosia has also resulted in unawareness being considered a 
multifaceted or multicomponent disorder involving several subtypes (Jehkonen et al., 
2006, Orfei et al., 2007, Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010). As such, different forms of 
anosognosia may reflect the combination of various deficits, the exact components of 
which are not currently known (Vocat & Vuilleumier, 2010). 
Recent accounts of AHP have employed a model of the motor system, which 
proposes that awareness involves a comparison of predicted and actual sensory 
information (Figure 1). It is suggested that AHP patients fail to register discrepancy 
between internal sensory predictions and external sensory information (Frith et al., 
2000, Berti et al., 2007). This results in an erroneous feeling of having performed 
intended movements using the paralysed limb. Recent experiments in AHP support 
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this idea; however, a purely motor account cannot explain several aspects of AHP, 
such as its delusional character (e.g. resilience to counterargument) and associated 
affective disturbance (Jenkinson & Fotopoulou, 2010). It is likely that other 
neurocognitive disturbances also contribute to AHP. On the basis of research in other 
delusional patients (Brebion et al., 2002), and a speculated reality monitoring 
impairment in an AHP case-report (Venneri & Shanks, 2004), we hypothesised that 
an inability to discriminate between internally- and externally-generated information 
(i.e. reality monitor) would contribute to AHP.  
We conducted two experiments to examine this proposal (Jenkinson et al., 
2009). Experiment 1 employed a classic reality monitoring paradigm (Johnson, 1991), 
to test the ability to discriminate between seen (perceived) and imagined drawings of 
objects in AHP patients (n=10), hemiplegic control patients without AHP (nonAHP, 
n=7) and age-matched healthy controls (HC, n=20). During a study phase, subjects 
were presented with a word (e.g. PEN) followed by either: (i) a picture representing 
the object (i.e. drawing of a pen), or (ii) an empty circle into which they projected a 
mental picture of the previous word (i.e. imagine a drawing of a pen). In a test phase, 
subjects saw previously studied (target) and unstudied (new) words, and had to decide 
if each word had been studied previously. Following this, words identified as 
previously studied were assessed in terms of the source of the original image (i.e. 
“Did you previously see or imagine a drawing of a [PEN]?”). AHP patients were 
significantly impaired at this task relative to HCs (omnibus Kruskal-Wallis test 
H(2)=21.23, p<.001) and nonAHP patients (post-hoc Mann-Whitney U=6, p=.006), 
indicating a deficit in discriminating the source of images as real/imagined. 
A second experiment explored if this reality monitoring deficit occurs in the 
motor domain. Adapting the procedure of Experiment 1, AHP (n=3), nonAHP (n=6), 
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and HC (n=20) subjects were presented orally with action phrases (e.g. point to the 
door), which they either had to execute themselves (perform item), imagine executing 
(imagine item), or observe the experimenter executing (observe item). The ability to 
discriminate studied/unstudied phrases, and make source judgements was then 
assessed using the procedure of Experiment 1 (e.g. “Did you previously 
[perform/imagine/observe] pointing to the door?”). Results again indicated impaired 
reality monitoring in patients with AHP compared with HCs (H(2)=11.54, p=.001) 
and nonAHP patients (U=1, p=.048). However, the ability to reality monitor 
movements was also impaired in nonAHP patients relative to HCs (U=24, p=.026). 
Performance on the task showed a steady decline from HC levels, to mild impairment 
in nonAHP patients, and greatest impairment in AHP.  
Findings of these two experiments suggest a combination of reality monitoring 
impairments in the pathogenesis of AHP. Experiment 1 showed that the ability to 
discriminate between real and imagined drawings was impaired in AHP patients only. 
Experiment 2 showed that the ability to monitor actions is deficient in both AHP and 
nonAHP patients, but is more impaired in patients with AHP. As such, impaired 
reality monitoring of movement might be a general consequence of damage to the 
motor system. From our results it is not possible to identify whether the processes 
responsible for greater impairment of action reality monitoring in AHP are the same 
as those underlying the deficit observed in nonAHP patients. 
We speculate that this combination of reality monitoring deficits prevents 
AHP patients from checking the veracity of knowledge about the motor system and 
their current state generally. This is consistent with the ABC model (Vocat & 
Vuilleumier, 2010), in which awareness relies on an ability to Check available 
information, in order to change one’s Beliefs, and/or act upon signals of uncertainty 
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arising from subjective Appreciation (experience) of a specific function (e.g. moving). 
This explanation readily accommodates recent motor explanations of AHP (Frith et 
al., 2000; Berti et al., 2007): the erroneous belief that one is able to move may arise 
from a defective appreciation of paralysis, caused by impaired sensory feedback, 
and/or a failure to register discrepancies between motor intentions and sensory 
information. This explanation suggests that AHP can result from different deficits 
which combine to produce the same clinical endpoint. As such, it is able to account 
for the multifaceted nature of AHP; however, further research is needed to identify the 
exact factors which produce AHP. 
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Figure Caption 
 
Figure 1. A simple model of the motor system adapted from Frith et al., (2000). 
Actual and predicted sensory information are compared to generate a sensory 
discrepancy which signals movement error. 
 
 
 
 
 
